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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Lee A. Ridgley appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Course Of The Underlvincl Criminal Proceedinas (#29320) 
Ridgley was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct after having 
orallgenital and manuallgenital contact with his 12 year-old stepdaughter. 
(#29320 R., pp.27-28). Ridgley pled guilty to the lewd and lascivious charge in 
exchange for the dismissal of another pending case against him. (#29320 R., 
pp.23, 26; 2/26/02 Tr., p.2, Ls.1-4.) 
Several months later, Ridgley hired a new attorney and moved to withdraw 
his plea. (#29320 R., pp.33-36.) In support of his motion Ridgley claimed 1) 
"although he had requested information from Roger Williams [his previous 
attorney], he [Ridgley] has never seen a copy of the police report and is not sure 
as to what the factual allegations are against him;" 2) he did not have enough 
time with his attorney to "consult . . . about the rights he would be giving up, as 
well as, request to see any of the physical documentation offered by the State;" 
3) that he did not have "the benefit of counsel to visit with him about the 
alternatives that he may have so that he can make a free, voluntary, and knowing 
decision;" and 4) "it was represented to [Ridgley] by his counsel, Roger Williams, 
that the likely sentence in this case would be four (4) months in jail and then he 
would be placed on probation" and that he did not understand that "the Court 
could impose a life sentence . . . ." (#29320 R., pp.34-35.) Significantly, Ridgley 
did not assert that he was mentally or psychologically incapable of entering into 
the plea as a basis for withdrawing his plea. 
After holding an evidentiary hearing at which Roger Williams testified, the 
district court denied Ridgley's motion. (#29320 R., pp.45-48.) In denying the 
motion the court made a number of factual findings: 
1) Ridgley "was informed that the potential maximum penalty was 
life imprisonment." 
2) Ridgley "expressed no confusion and sought no clarification 
about the charges or his rights during the plea hearing.'' 
3) Ridgley "admitted the allegations against him" and "waived the 
right to have an information filed against him." 
4) Ridgley's attorney, Roger Williams, "spent time with [Ridgley] 
prior to the preliminary hearing and discussed the charges with 
him." 
5) Ridgley admitted to the judge taking the plea that his attorney 
had "discussed the matter thoroughly" with him. 
6) "That in obtaining the plea bargain, Mr. Williams was following 
his client's wishes" and that "[uJnder the circumstances of this 
case, there was no requirement to engage in discovery once 
[Ridgleyj informed his counsel of his desire to plead guilty" 
because of Ridgley's initial desire to plead guilty. 
(#29320, R., p.47.) The district court later sentenced Ridgley to a unified life 
sentence with ten years fixed. (#29320, R., p.78.) 
Ridgley appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea and his 
sentence. (#29320, R., pp.81-83.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. 
v. Ridgley, Docket No. 29320, 2004 Unpublished 0binion No. 430 (Idaho Ct. 
App. April 6, 2004). 
Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedinas 
On April 4, 2005, Ridgley filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.3-7.) In his petition, Ridgley asserted 
essentially the same arguments and relied on the same facts as contained in his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Ridgley asserts his counsel: 1) "spent less 
than one (1) hour with [him] before he entered his guilty plea;" 2) did not contact 
any of the witnesses or review the audiotapes and videotapes in the case; 3) "did 
not listen to [his] pleas that [he, Ridgley] was not understanding [his attorney's 
comments]" and failed to listen to Ridgley's complaints that Ridgley "did not 
understand the proceedings and the implications of what was transpiring both in 
the criminal case"; 4) "would not visit" him so Ridgley could discuss the "potential 
defense that [Ridgley] would have" in his case; 5) "failed to advise [Ridgley] of 
the potential of having an evaluation to determine [Ridgley's] mental status, [and] 
whether or not [Ridgleyj would appreciate the proceedings that were filed against 
[him]"; and 6) did not recognize Ridgley's "state of shock and disbelief' which led 
to his involuntary signing of his plea and verbalized waiver of rights. (R., pp.4-5.) 
The state filed an answer and moved for summary dismissal. (R., pp.14- 
21 .) The district court considered the motion for summary dismissal and filed a 
notice of intent to dismiss on the grounds that Ridgley's petition did not contain a 
factual basis sufficient to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., pp.105-110.) 
Ridgley responded to the notice of intent to dismiss with affidavits from 
himself and his second counsel -- Mr. Hull. (R., pp.23-25.) The district court 
concluded, however, that Ridgley's response did not rectify the deficiencies 
identified in the notice of intent to dismiss and, consequently, summarily 
dismissed Ridgley's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.152-61.) Ridgiey 
appeals that dismissal. (R., pp.165-66.) 
ISSUES 
Ridgley states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. 
Ridgley's petition for post-conviction relief because he raised 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his attorney 
was ineffective? 
2. Did the district court err by dismissing on grounds not set 
forth in the notice to dismiss? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court properly dismiss Ridgley's petition where the 
district court recognized there was no factual basis for Ridgley's claims because 
of the district court's factual findings regarding Ridgley's motion to withdraw his 
plea and where Ridgley's claims were barred by res judicata? 
2. Did Ridgley receive sufficient notice of his petition's deficiencies 
where the district court's notice of its intent to dismiss informed Ridgley that the 
factual basis for his deficient performance claim was affirmatively disproved by 




The District Court Properly Dismissed Ridgley's Petition Because Ridqely Failed 
To Meet His Burden Of Establishing A Factual Basis For His Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Ridgley argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition 
claiming his petition created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his 
attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-15.) 
This argument has no merit. Ridgley's petition and supporting affidavits either 
rely on facts that have been affirmatively disproved by the record or make 
conclusory claims that do not have any factual basis. Consequently, Ridgley has 
not met his burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact and the district 
court's summary dismissal of Ridgley's petition was appropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 ldaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. Id. at 434, 835 P.2d 
at 669. The question of whether an action is barred by res judicata is a question 
of law over which the appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Rhoades, 
134 ldaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481,482 (2000). 
C. Ridqlev's Petition And Affidavits Do Not Create A Genuine issue Of 
Material Fact 
Ridgley contends his petition and submitted affidavits are sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washinqton, the Supreme 
Court set forth a two-prong test that a defendant must satisfy in order to be 
entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984). Per Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different. Id.; see also Araaon v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 760, 
760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell v. State, 118 ldaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 
656 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Ridgley's post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be 
divided into two categories: Ridgley's claims that his counsel: 1) did not spend 
sufficient time with him to discuss the particulars of his case and failed to 
investigate and review evidence, and 2) should have been aware of his mental 
status and inability to understand the proceedings and, therefore, should have 
discussed the possibility of a psychological evaluation with Ridgley. (R., pp.4-5.) 
The first category of claims is barred by res judicata. Moreover, they are claims 
without factual basis because the facts upon which Ridgley relies are facts that 
have been affirmatively disproved by the record. Ridgley's second category of 
claims are based on conclusory statements without factual basis and, therefore, 
do not create a genuine issue of material fact. 
1. Ridaley's Claims That His Attorney Failed To Meet With Him To 
Discuss Possible Defenses And Failed To Review Evidence Are 
Claims Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of issues that have been 
previously decided in a final judgment or decision in an action between the same 
litigants. Rhoades, 134 ldaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482; Gubler v. Brvdon, 125 
ldaho 107, 110, 867 P.2d 981, 984 (1994) (res judicata "prevents the litigation of 
causes of action which were finally decided in a previous suit"). Thus, "when 
legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding." State v. Creech, 132 ldaho I, 10, 966 P.2d 1, 10 (1998) 
(citing State v. Beam, 115 ldaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988); State v. 
Fetterly, 115 ldaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988)). 
Ridgley claims his counsel was ineffective because he did not spend 
sufficient time with him, failed discuss defenses with him, and failed to investigate 
or review evidence. (R., pp.4-5.) These are claims that have already been 
presented (#29329, R., p.334-35), rejected (#29329, R., p.78), and affirmed on 
direct appeal (State v. Ridgley, Docket No. 29320, 2004 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 430 (Idaho Ct. App. April 6, 2004). Consequently, because these issues 
have already been decided, they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
2. Even If Ridgley's Claims Are Not Barred Bv The Doctrine Of Res 
Judicata, Ridalev's Claims That His Attornev Failed To Meet With 
Him To Discuss Possible Defenses And Failed To Review 
Evidence Are Based On Facts Affirmativelv Disproved Bv The 
Record 
"Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of 
relief when they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, 
or do not justify relief as a matter of law." Cooper v. State, 96 ldaho 542, 545, 
531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). A district court properly dismisses a petition where 
at least one element that the petitioner must establish is "clearly disproved" by 
the record of the underlying criminal case. Stuart v. State, 118 ldaho 865, 869, 
801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Chouinard v. State, 127 ldaho 836, 839, 907 P.2d 
813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995); Reminuton v. State, 127 ldaho 443, 446-47, 901 P.2d 
134, 137-38 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Here, the record of the underlying criminal case "clearly disproves" 
Ridgley's claims that the district court erred in finding that no genuine issue of 
material fact was raised by Ridgley's assertion that his attorney spent a limited 
amount of time with him, failed to discuss his defenses with him, and did not 
review the audio and video tapes of the interview with his abused step-daughter. 
Ridgley argues on appeal that the "district court was improperly weighing the 
evidence [by] balancing Mr. Ridgley's evidence against the testimony of his 
attorney." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The court did no such thing. The district 
court recognized that the trial court, in ruling on Ridgeley's motion to withdraw his 
plea, made factual determinations that factually precluded Ridgley's post- 
conviction deficient performance claim. (R., pp.155-56.) 
The district court acknowledged the trial court's previous factual 
determinations that Ridgley met with his attorney on at least three occasions and 
spent' time enough time with Ridgley to discuss the charges and possible 
punishment. (R., p.155.) Indeed, the record shows that before Ridgley waived 
his rights at the preliminary hearing, Ridgley "discussed the matter thoroughly 
with his attorney." (#29320 R., p.47.) In determining that Ridgley was not 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court also found that Ridgley insisted 
and was eager to plead guilty from the beginning and that, consequently, his 
attorney had no obligation to engage in additional discovery, Le., review the 
audio or videotapes or interview witnesses. (#29320 R., p.47.) Consequently, 
Ridgley's present post-conviction claims based on these facts have no basis 
because they are facts affirmatively disproved by the record. 
3. Ridqlev's Post-Conviction Claims That His Attorney Failed To 
Appreciate His Mental Status And Therefore Failed To Reauest A 
Psvcholoc~ical Evaluation Are Also Without Factual Sup~or t  
Ridgley claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney failed to appreciate his mental state (R., pp.4-5) and failed to speak with 
him about the possibility of "receiving a mental evaluation" (R., p.113). The 
district court considered these claims and concluded that Ridgley's petition was 
factually deficient on both Strickland requirements. 
Regarding deficient performance, the district court reasoned that Ridgley's 
petition and supplemental affidavits did not recite any facts suggesting that 
Ridgley was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea. (R., p.155.) The 
district court further found that Ridgley did not submit facts showing how he was 
prejudiced. ((R., pp.159-160.) The district court noted the affidavit submitted by 
his second attorney in response to the court's notice of its intent to dismiss 
suggested that there was no factual support for his assertion that he was in 
"shock" and did not understand what was going on when he entered his plea or 
that he said anything about his mental state to Mr. Williams, his first attorney. 
Further, Mr. Hull's affidavit states explicitly that if he was an attorney representing 
a client in Ridgley's circumstance, he would have requested a mental evaluation 
and would not have proceeded. (R., pp.118-19.) However, as pointed out by the 
district court, Mr. Hull never addressed Ridgley's mental status when he was 
Ridgley's attorney and asking the court to withdraw Ridgley's plea -- indicating 
that Ridgiey was competent and that his mental status was never an issue. (R., 
The district court also determined that Ridgley's own statements regarding 
his state of mind were conclusory, without factual support and, therefore, 
insufficient to avoid summary dismissal. The court reasoned: 
The only evidence offered in this case that Ridgley was emotionally 
distraught, in a state of shock, and incompetent are the allegations 
of Ridgley's own affidavit. Ridgley's own conclusory and bare 
assertions, alone, are not sufficient to survive summary dismissal. 
Attorney Williams testified Ridgley appeared to be quite competent 
and understood the nature and magnitude of what he was facing. 
Ridgley never raised the argument of incompetency during the 
hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Nor does 
Ridgley's petition raise any issue about the failure to assert the 
mental health issues at the hearing on the motion to withdraw. 
While Ridgley's affidavit does raise the fact issue that he was 
emotionally distraught when he entered the guilty plea, the affidavit 
offers no more than a mere conclusion that he was not competent 
to understand the nature of the proceedings and knowingly enter 
into a guilty plea, and is unsupported by any facts as to the alleged 
mental incompetency. 
(R., p.159.) Ridgley has not identified any error in this analysis. Mr. Williams 
testified that he used his first meeting with Ridgley to gauge Ridgley's "emotional 
state" and that he told Ridgley they would meet again to discuss the charges. 
(5128102 Tr., p.43, L.17 - p.44, L . l l . )  After subsequent visits Ridgley decided to 
plead guilty. (5128102 Tr., p.42, Ls.11-16.) Williams testified that Ridgley, at this 
latter time, "knew exactly what he was doing and what the plea bargain was and 
what he was assuming." (5128102 Tr., p.42, Ls.11-16.) This testimony is 
consistent with the psychological evaluation done for purposes of sentencing. 
That report found that although Ridgley was "emotionally overwhelmed" there 
was absolutely no "impairment in intellectual functioning." (R., p.144; #29320 
PSI Psychological Report, p.30.) Accordingly, to the extent that Ridgley asserts 
his emotional state is evidence that his attorney should have known that he could 
not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily enter his guilty plea, it is a fact 
disproved by the record. As such, there is no factual support for Ridgley's claim. 
Moreover, even if there was deficient performance, Ridgley failed to 
submit facts showing how he was prejudiced. Where a guilty plea is entered a 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's errors 
the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial. Gi[pin- 
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 57 P.3d 787, 793 (2002). As pointed out by 
the district court, Ridgley has not identified facts showing that an evaluation 
would have produced any additional information other than what was in the PSI 
psychological report or that a court, based on Ridgley's assertions, would have 
even ordered such an evaluation. (R., pp.159-60.) 
Ridgley apparently believes he has met his burden simply because his 
affidavit says that he will go to trial if his post-conviction petition is granted. (R., 
p.114.) This, however, is not the standard. Ridgley must show a reasonable 
probability that but for his counsel's deficiencies he would have gone to trial at 
the time he entered his plea. Ridgley has not made this claim and, even if he 
did, there is nothing in the record that would support such a claim. Ridgley fails 
to identify any possible defense and fails to explain how or if his reasons 
expressed to his initial attorney for not wanting to go to trial have changed. 
Ridgley relies solely on his conclusory assertion, disproved by the record, that he 
did not have the mental capacity to enter his plea. 
II. 
The District Court Properlv Dismissed Ridqlev's Petition On Grounds Set Forth In 
The Notice Of Intent To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Ridgley claims the "notice of intent to dismiss did not address any issues 
relating to Mr. Ridgley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea" and as a result erred 
in dismissing the petition. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Ridgley's claim is without 
legal merit. Ridgley was not entitled to double notice -- notice of why his 
response to the district court's initial notice was still deficient. 
B. Ridalev Had Adequate Notice Of The Basis For Dismissal Of His Claims 
Ridgley asserts that it was improper for the district court to rely on the 
underlying trial court's factual findings to conclude that Ridgley's claims had no 
factual basis. Ridgley contends that because he was not put on notice of these 
facts -- facts contained in the record -- his claim was improperly dismissed. 
Ridgley's argument is logically and legally flawed. 
Before dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief, a district court is 
required to give notice of the petition's deficiencies. Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 
438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (2001) ("[The court may not dismiss a petition sua 
sponte without first giving notice of its intent, stating the grounds for the dismissal 
with particularity, and allowing the petitioner twenty days in which to respond.") It 
is undisputed that Ridgley filed a petition and that the district court filed a notice 
of intent to dismiss. In that notice the court stated with particularity the deficient 
nature of the petition as to both deficient performance and prejudice -- primarily 
an absence of factual support. (R., pp.105-11.) Ridgley was given twenty days 
to respond and he did -- by submitting two additional affidavits, one from himself, 
and one from his attorney. (R., pp.112-14; 117-20.) The district court considered 
those affidavits, and the factual assertions contained therein. However, the court 
concluded the factual information supporting his claim was disproved by facts in 
the record. Because Ridgley's supplemental affidavits did not cure his petition's 
identified deficiencies and because Ridgley had been given notice of those 
deficiencies with the opportunity to respond, the district court dismissed Ridgley's 
petition. 
Ridgley apparently believes he should have received notice of the fact that 
his response was deficient. There is no statutory authority or case law that 
requires a district court to provide this double notice. The case law is clear. A 
post-conviction petitioner is entitled to particularized notice of his petition's 
deficiencies. See Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441, 128 P.3d at 978. Ridgley is not 
entitled to notice of his response's deficiencies. Accordingly, Ridgley's claim that 
he did not receive proper notice is without basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's 
summary dismissal of Ridgley's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 26ih day of December 2007. 
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